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Abstract: During the last few decades, a critical scarcity of water has occurred in the Middle East
due to climate change and the mismanagement of water resources. The situation is complicated by
the absence of an effective legislative framework at the local level as well as by the incapability and
disrepute of the local water authorities. Most Iraqi citizens depend on the surface waters of the Tigris
and Euphrates rivers, which have their sources in upstream neighbouring countries. Water crises
concerning the shared waters urgently require a solution at the international level. Unfortunately,
Iraq has faced several wars in a row (1980–2003), which has prevented the country from establishing
its institutions. The rapid increase in the population of the transboundary countries on the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers, and the high demands on agriculture, are accelerating water exploitation. In this
paper, the present state of water management in Iraq from the viewpoint of the legislative framework,
water balance, and transboundary issues will be discussed, with special attention to Kurdistan. Many
legislative documents have been established or amended by the Iraqi and Kurdistan parliaments
since 2003. In 2015, the Kurdistan Government Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, in
cooperation with the EU, issued a guide for environmental legislation related to all environmental
components such as air, water, and soil. The recommendations on actions needed in the water
management in Kurdistan will be presented; they are inspired by the Water Framework Directive
(WFD) (2000/60/EC) implemented in EU member states.
Keywords: water management; transboundary river basin; Kurdistan
1. Introduction
The problem of the insufficient availability of freshwater resources under the threat of climate
change, pollution, and natural hazards is becoming urgent worldwide, not only in arid and semi-arid
regions [1]. Iraq relies mainly on surface water represented by two rivers (the Tigris and Euphrates)
and its accumulation in reservoir dams. Only a small part of water resources (14%) comes from
groundwater resources, either shallow unconfined or deep confined groundwater aquifers. Fifty
percent of the available surface water in Iraq originates from upstream rivers in the neighbouring
countries of Turkey and Iran through the Kurdistan Region, which directly affects the downstream
rivers. Therefore, an integrated water resource management (IWRM) approach is required for these
transboundary rivers. The locations of the transboundary river basins in Iraq throughout the Kurdistan
region, and the water balance (inflow and outflow) are shown in the map in Figure 1.
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Iraq shares the Tigris and Euphrates river basins with Turkey, while the Euphrates Basin is also 
shared with Syria. Iraq and Syria consider the Euphrates to be an international river and initiated an 
immediate sharing agreement based on the needs declared by each country. Turkey regarded both 
the Tigris and Euphrates basins as single cross-border river basins [2,3], which has a legislative 
implication. The international water basins convention for non-navigational uses [4] emphasizes 
several principles that have been established by international legislations and rules. The principle of 
the equitable and reasonable utilization of shared water resources represents the key element to be 
respected by all sharing countries [5]. 
Iraq did not have any problem with the sharing of the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates 
rivers until new factors emerged in Turkey’s water consumption rates and its water policy. 
Additionally, Turkish-Iraqi relations have been influenced by many factors, with the most important 
ones being security, and strategic economic and cultural aspects. 
During recent decades, many water projects have been ongoing in Iraq´s neighbouring 
countries. One important project was the Turkish GAP project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Proje), whose 
name means “South-eastern Anatolia Project”. The GAP is a major and comprehensive water 
management project in the southern part of Turkey set by the Regional Development Administration 
(RDA). It was completed in the period 1975–2017 with a total cost of $32 billion. The project was 
composed of 13 individual projects, including the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydropower plants 
producing 27 gigawatts (GW) of electricity. The irrigated area is estimated at 1.8 million hectares, 
representing 9.7% of Turkish land [3,6]. 
This project has created a new era of long-term collaboration between the riparian countries of 
transboundary rivers. The lack of water resources generates conflict of interest between sharing 
countries. It is apparent that a long-term sustainable solution requires the acceptance of all concerned 
countries. Due to internal political instabilities, Iraq possesses less political influence in the region [6]. 
As the headwaters of both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers are in Turkey, Turkey has become the main 
power steering the water policy in the region. Accordingly, having such a large quantity of water 
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Iraq shares the Tigris and Euphrates river basins with Turkey, while the Euphrates Basin is also
shared with Syria. Iraq and Syria consider the Euphrates to be an international river and initiated an
immediate sharing agreement based on the needs declared by each country. Turkey regarded both the
Tigris and Euphrates basins as single cross-border river basins [2,3], which has a legislative implication.
The international water basins convention for non-navigational uses [4] emphasizes several principles
that have been established by international legislations and rules. The principle of the equitable and
reasonable utilization of shared water resources represents the key element to be respected by all
sharing countries [5].
Iraq did not have any problem with the sharing of the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers
until new factors emerged in Turkey’s water consumption rates and its water policy. Additionally,
Turkish-Iraqi relations have been influenced by many factors, with the most important ones being
security, and strategic economic and cultural aspects.
During recent decades, many water projects have been ongoing in Iraq´s neighbouring countries.
One important project was the Turkish GAP project (Güneydog˘u Anadolu Proje), whose name means
“South-eastern Anatolia Project”. The GAP is a major and comprehensive water management project in
the southern part of Turkey set by the Regional Development Administration (RDA). It was completed
in the period 1975–2017 with a total cost of $32 billion. The project was composed of 13 individual
projects, including the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydropower plants producing 27 gigawatts
(GW) of electricity. The irrigated area is estimated at 1.8 million hectares, representing 9.7% of Turkish
land [3,6].
This project has created a new era of long-term collaboration between the riparian countries
of transboundary rivers. The lack of water resources generates conflict of interest between sharing
countries. It is apparent that a long-term sustainable solution requires the acceptance of all concerned
countries. Due to internal political instabilities, Iraq possesses less political influence in the region [6].
As the headwaters of both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers are in Turkey, Turkey has become the main
power steering the water policy in the region. Accordingly, having such a large quantity of water
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allows Turkey to negotiate with Israel, Iraq, and Syria in defining the division of this precious resource
and obtaining privileges from all these countries [7].
The potential water crisis in Iraq is deepened by the fact that it does not put sufficient financial
investments into its national water resources due to internal political conflict. It should have been
compulsory for the governments of Iraq to encourage measures ensuring water security. This need is
urgent, especially in the situation of the absence of effective international law relating to long-term
planning and strategies of transboundary water body management [8].
Based on analysing the list of legislation documents in force in Iraq concerning water resource
management, it can be recognized that legislators have demonstrated a degree of awareness related to
the legal perspective of water resources in the country in various sectors. This fact demonstrates the
goodwill of the Iraqi Government in developing a legal framework for its national water resources [9].
Notwithstanding, Iraqi legislation concerning the efficiency of the water distribution
network must be reviewed and improved by stakeholders cooperating with the private sector,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic staff in universities, and international
organizations. Iraq must have a strategic water directive vision that includes a long-term integrated
national water plan [10]. It is regrettable that during the last 50 years, Iraq has not given priority or
sufficient attention to the water management framework [11].
2. Objectives of Study
Sustainable water management in Iraq is becoming an urgent and inevitable task, despite the
political instability in the region. This article will summarize the key aspects of water management
in Iraq, with special attention to the Kurdistan region, and discuss possible changes to the legislative
framework. Undoubtedly, the best model for a holistic approach to water management is management
by river basin, the natural geographical and hydrological unit, instead of by administrative or political
boundaries. This model requires wide collaboration of water sharing countries, overcoming their
political differences and potential conflicts. Water management by river basin was successfully
implemented in the European Union (EU) by EU Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC (WFD),
which could be considered as good international practice. The recommendations presented in this
paper were inspired by analysing national water management framework and practices in Iraq
(Kurdistan) in a light of EU legislation. In 2015, the project titled “Environment Legislation Guides in
Kurdistan as first step toward WFD”, supported by the EU and the Kurdistan Regional Government,
created ground for analysing the present state, key problems, and potential improvements in Iraqi
water management.
The main objective behind this study is to describe the background and analyse the major problems
of water management in Kurdistan Region (part of Iraq), with special emphasis on water balance.
The description of recent state and its critical analysis represent the introductory steps needed for
establishing a specific framework for Iraq regarding the protection of surface waters and groundwater
including transboundary aquifers, in terms of quality and quantity management.
The implementation of a proper water management strategy must be based on the establishment
of a clear legislative framework at the national and regional levels. In the recent unstable political
situation in Iraq, this task seems to be extremely challenging. The future actions in the establishing
water management framework for Iraq include (but are not limited to):
• Stopping the further deterioration of the qualitative and quantitative status of water bodies;
• Creating a clear and unambiguous legislative framework for the protection and management of
water resources at the river basin scale;
• Introducing water management plans and updating periods through strategic planning to mitigate
the impacts of floods and droughts;
• Clarifying the responsibilities of the water authorities at the national and regional levels and all
legislative procedures.
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3. EU Water Legislative Framework—Key Principles and Objectives
The awareness of the need to protect water resources in individual European countries can be
determined as having started in the 1970s (e.g., Water Act 1973 c. 37, United Kingdom Public General
Acts or Water Act 138/1973 Sb., former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic). Its main emission control
element was the Dangerous Substances Directive Council Directive 76/464/EEC [12]. However, not
much later at the end of the 1980s, gaps were identified in addressing pollution from urban wastewater
and agriculture. In response, the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive [13] and the Nitrates
Directive [14] were adopted. Those directives were followed by a new Drinking Water Directive [15],
and a Directive for Integrated Pollution and Prevention Control (IPPC) [16]. An Industrial Emissions
Directive—IED 2010/75/EU [17]—repealed the IPPC Directive and the sectoral directives.
From the abovementioned list, it is apparent that water policy was very fragmented in terms of
both objectives and means. In response to the need for a single piece of framework legislation, the
EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) was adopted in 2000 [18]. The consequences of this were a
shift from sectoral environmental protection to a more integrated form, as well as the establishment of
compulsory environmental standards and status [19]. The WFD introduced the ambitious objective
that all groundwater, surface and coastal waters in the EU should achieve a “good status” (good
ecological quality) by 2015. “Good ecological status” can be understood to mean that water can be
used by humans as long as the ecological function of the water body (surface and groundwater) is
not significantly damaged. This modern piece of EU legislation establishes clear objectives, and is
based on achieving milestones such as the risk evaluation of anthropogenic pressures and impacts,
monitoring programs, development of river basin management plans, and the design and operation of
programs of measures [20]. The WFD imposed a new and revolutionary form of responsibility on the
EU member states [19]. Teodosiu et al. [21] summarized the principal objectives of the WFD as follows:
• Expansion of the scope of water protection to all waters, including surface waters, groundwater,
and coastal and transitional waters;
• Water management based on river basins;
• A “combined approach” of emission limit values and quality standards;
• Setting of the right prices;
• Encouragement of closer citizen involvement;
• Streamlining of legislation.
Concerning surface waters, the objective is to reach a “good ecological status” and a “good
chemical status”. Groundwater protection, however, requires specific approaches. Groundwater
should not be viewed only as a drinking water resource or resource of water for industry or agriculture.
The WFD [18] established for the first time that groundwater should be protected for its environmental
value; whereas the aim for surface waters was to reach a good ecological and good chemical status, the
WFD focuses on both quantitative and qualitative status objectives for groundwater. Chemical criteria
are more complex and are dependent on local geological and hydrogeological background conditions.
Thus, the Groundwater Directive 2006/118/EC [22] was adopted clarifying the criteria for a “good
chemical status” and specifications related to the identification and reversal of pollution trends.
The WFD introduced a revolutionary approach to water governance, offering more flexibility
than previous directives and an opportunity for continuous policy adjustments [23–25]. The WFD is
not target-based legislation. It is, however, explicitly stated that no water bodies are to experience
deterioration in status from one class to another [26,27].
Fifteen years after the WFD was introduced, achieving its objectives remains a challenge.
Voulvoulis et al. [28] reviewed the WFD implementation efforts, focusing on the interpretation of its key
principles in the process. The objective of their study was to understand why the great expectations that
came with the WFD have not yet been fully fulfilled. Additionally, Voulvoulis et al. [28] commented
that 47% of EU surface waters did not reach the good ecological status by 2015, which was a principal
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objective of the WFD [29]. This study emphasized the need to review or revise current implementation
efforts, which would allow the directive to deliver its systemic intent to reach its full potential.
The WFD introduced integrated water management by river basins. Integrated and traditional
water management differ in terms of objectives and target areas [21]: traditional management focuses
on a specific and a single domain of water use (water supply, irrigation, wastewater treatment, pollution
control, etc.), whereas integrated management tries to gather all these sectors into a unified framework
with each sector having individual importance. The principles of integrated water management in the
context of the WFD are discussed, e.g., by Reference [30].
4. Water Management in Kurdistan
A successful water management policy basically relies on and revolves around factors such
as awareness, socio-economic status, well suited supply costs, data availability and reliability,
and a schematic assessment of population growth. There are two main kinds of challenges
related to water crises in the Kurdistan Region: external challenges represented by climate change,
international agreements, and the GAP project; and internal challenges represented by inadequate
water management, political instability, lack of local policies, and an insufficient legal framework [6].
The population of Kurdistan rapidly increased to an unbelievable extent from 2009–2017. The
main factors influencing population growth were flash waves of Syrian refugees in 2010 and a high
rate of incoming Iraqi internally displaced persons (IDPs) under the impact of unstable security due
to ISIS attack in 2014. These events increased the population by 28%. Moreover, there was migration
from rural areas to urban regions driven by the search for increased chances of employment [31,32].
Many state and local administration authorities are responsible for various water subsectors; thus,
the system is complicated, with possibly overlapping rights and responsibilities. The current state of
responsibilities of the Iraqi water authorities is shown in Table 1. It could be compared to the situation
in Turkey, where the implementation of the EU’s WFD was planned [33].
Table 1. Responsibilities of Iraqi water authorities.
Organization Main Tasks and Responsibilities
Ministry of Agriculture and Water
Resources (MAWR)
• Sharing hydraulic and operational information about
transboundary rivers (Tigris and Euphrates).
• Applying the principle of integrated water resource
management (IWRM), similarly to that which is applied in
Turkey and EU countries.
• Coordinating between water resources and water
demand sectors.
• Monitoring the surface and groundwater status.
• Legislating acts related to protect groundwater bodies.
• Planning the application of rational irrigation techniques.
• Reclaiming marshlands.
• Developing fishery projects through supporting the
private sector.
• Managing river basins based on the scope of legal
exploitation of water supply and the organization of
sand/gravel quarry works.
Ministry of Municipalities (MoM)
• Providing and supplying domestic water for both urban and
rural areas.
• Protecting the water supply networks from leaks
and damages.
• Legislating the recovery cost instructions of supplied water.
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Table 1. Cont.
Organization Main Tasks and Responsibilities
Ministry of Environment (MoE)
• Protecting and improving water quality.
• Developing and improving wastewater management.
• Employing integrated management of hazardous chemicals.
• Performing necessary surveys to specify environmental
impacts resulting from the use of internationally
prohibited weapons.
• Implementing the standard limits of contamination allowed
in water resources used for different purposes.
General Directorate of Meteorology and
Seismology (GDMS)
• Continuously recording and monitoring meteorological and
seismological events.
• Forecasting natural hazards such as floods, drought,
and earthquakes.
Central Agency for Standardization and
Quality Control (CASQC)
• Creating and controlling the physical and chemical standards
of water quality for multiple purposes.
• Specifying general requirements for non-bottled drinking
water, including water produced from water intakes and dam
reservoirs, transported through distribution networks and
special conveyance vehicles according to Iraqi standards
relating to water quality: IQS/417/2001, ICS:13.060.20
Ministry of Electricity (MoEl) • Planning and constructing hydropower plants.
4.1. The Influence of Transboundary River Conflicts on River Basin Management
The first definition of the international watercourse was created in the Geneva Convention of 1815.
In 1997, the United Nations Convention on the “Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses” GA RES 51/229 (21 May 1997) was adopted [4].
Globally, approximately 270 international rivers exist within international river basins around the
world, yet the riparian countries of only 40% of these international water basins have signed a formal
agreement to secure their fair shares of the water resources [34–37]. International law, international
court judgements, and all international norms have settled on two main points with regard to the
international sharing of waters. First, any surface water body belonging to one drainage basin should
be treated as a whole and not a separate unit. Second, each country located on one transboundary
river basin has the right to a reasonable and equal share in the beneficial use of water, unless there are
bilateral agreements or binding conventions [36,38]. The Helsinki agreement of 1966 (Articles 4 and 5)
indicates the share of water for every riparian country according to basin hydrogeology, the economic
and social needs of each country, climate change impact on the basin, the population relying on the
basin water for each riparian country, the availability of alternative resources, and the extent to which
one or more basin countries can be compensated as a means of controlling conflicts between water
users [36,39]. The fast-rising water demand inevitably leads to conflicts among riparian countries,
particularly when utilities are considered as non-essential, to benefit only a few people, etc. [40]. “The
balance between the public nature of the resource and private rights to it will continue to be the subject
of political contestation as will entitlements to waters in shared rivers and the obligations of riparian
states to each other” [41].
Iraq is a country that mainly depends on the two international transboundary rivers of the Tigris
and Euphrates. Syria, on the other hand, mainly depends only on the Euphrates. The headwaters
of both rivers originate in Turkey, and both countries have had conflicts with Turkey since their
independence. Since the 1960s, the demand for water resources within these countries has surprisingly
increased as their populations have doubled in size [6]. Although Iraq, Syria, and Turkey have
negotiated sporadically, with diplomatic and technical discussions concerning the waters of the
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Euphrates River occurring for decades, they have still not been able to agree on a permanent tripartite
treaty. The issue of setting the right terminology to be used for this transboundary river persists, with
“sharing” suggested by Iraq and Syria, while Turkey insists on the term “allocating” [42]. The Turkish
position regarding the water issue in Iraq illustrates that Iraqi officials should establish a strategy on
how to connect the Tigris and Euphrates through the Tharthar channel to compensate the shortage
in the Euphrates. Turkey still believes that the Tigris and Euphrates represent one basin, and claims
that neither river is international but that they are merely transboundary. In contrast, Turkey listed the
Tigris and Euphrates as separate basins in the hydrogeological studies done by the Turkish General
Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (abbreviation DSI in Turkish), naming the Euphrates basin No.
21 and the Tigris basin No. 26 [36].
The drainage pattern system of the Kurdistan Region is governed by four major, roughly parallel
rivers, with a flow direction from the northeast to the southwest. The confluence of each tributary, i.e.,
Khabour, Great Zab, Little Zab, and Sirwan, with the Tigris River from north to south, respectively,
is either outside or just at the border of the Kurdistan Region. The headwaters of the Khabour and
Greater Zab tributaries originate in Turkey, while the Little Zab and Sirwan headwaters are in Iran.
Although the Udhem basin is completely within Iraq, it has very limited resources, as it drains only
the dry lowland Garmian area (Table 2).
Table 2. River basins in Northern Iraq, data source [43].
River Basin 1 Tigris(Direct) 2 Khabour
3 Greater
Zab
4 Little
Zab 5 Udhem 6 Sirwan
Origin Turkey Turkey Turkey Iran Iraq Iran
Catchment
area (km2)
Upstream
of Iraq
border
40,600 1303 1 9414 4883 - 17,423 2
Within
Kurdistan
Region
2770 2627 16,696 12,229 5774 9286
Total at
mouth n/a
3 6027 26,331 19,593 n/a 3 n/a
Existing large dam Mosul - Bekhme(planned) Dokan - Derbendikhan
Governorates Duhok Erbil
Suleiymaniya
Garmian
1 In addition, the border section of the lower Khabour drains another 2097 km2 of Turkish territory; 2 Of which
13,431 km2 upstream of Derbendikhan Reservoir; 3 No data.
Although Iraq has a relatively large share of the river basins, approximately 50% of the surface
water resources originate upstream, i.e., outside the border of Iraq, while 50% of the Tigris and 90%
of the Euphrates originate from Turkey [44]. Three major dams have been constructed on the Tigris
and its tributaries, namely the Mosul, Dokan, and Derbendikhan dams on the Tigris, Little Zab, and
Sirwan, respectively. There is a plan to build the Bekhme Dam on the Greater Zab River, which is
estimated to become the largest dam in Iraq. Table 3 provides an overview of the constructed dams.
Regarding sharing waters with Iran, both of the Tigris tributaries, Little Zab (also named Lesser
or Lower Zab) and Sirwan, originate in Iran. The impact of upstream country water management in
Iran was manifested when Iranian officials started to utilize the shared water resources through the
construction of dams on these two tributaries. In 2009, the Iranian government started the construction
of Daryan Dam on the Sirwan River, 28.5 km from the Iraqi border. When the Daryan Dam was about
to be completed (in 2015), the measured inflow (2.4 m3/s) was not sufficient to prevent the river from
being contaminated due to insufficient dilution rates; this rate represents only 40% of the original
discharge [45].
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In 2011, Iran continued its strategy to tackle water scarcity through the construction of the Sardasht
Dam on the Little Zab river, 9 km from the Iraqi border. Its operation (from June 2017) resulted
in a shortage of drinking and irrigation water in most of the regions of Suleiymaniya Province in
Kurdistan. Its negative impact could also be seen on the annual capacity of Dokan Dam (1954–1975) [37].
Accordingly, the absence of effective understanding between Iraq and Iran left Iraq suffering from the
lack of water resources, while there is no legal paper to be used in the UN General Assembly to instigate
upstream countries to regulate the transboundary waters among riparian countries [37,46]. The conflict
remains a pending issue between Iraq and Iran. The reason for this is that Iran is positioned as the
owner of its natural resources, and supposes that under “the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty”
it has the authority to utilize its water resources fully according to its need without restrictions [37,47].
Table 3. The dams built on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in riparian countries, data sources [44,48].
Dam Country OperationalYear River
Capacity
(BCM) * Purpose
Hydro-Power
(MW) *
Irrigated
Area (ha) *
Keban Turkey 1974 Euphrates 30.6 Hydro-power,irrigation, flood control 1330 63,872
Karakaya Turkey 1987 Euphrates 9.5 Hydro-power 1800 -
Ataturk Turkey 1992 Euphrates 48.7
Hydro-power,
irrigation, fishery,
recreation and sport
2400 882,000
Birecik Turkey 2000 Euphrates 1.22 Hydro-power,irrigation 672 95,000
Ilisu Turkey 2018 Tigris 10.41 Hydro-power,flood control 1200 -
Tabqa Syria 1975 Euphrates 11.7 Hydro-power,irrigation 800 124,000
Sardasht Iran 2017 Tigris-L.Zab * 0.38 Hydro-power,irrigation 421 80,500
Daryan Iran 2018 Tigris-Sirwan 0.36 Hydro-power,flood control 230 -
Derbendi-khan Iraq 1965 Tigris-Sirwan 3 Hydro-power, watersupply 249 -
Dokan Iraq 1975 Tigris-L.Zab 6.97 Hydro-power,irrigation 400 35,500
Mosul Iraq 1986 Tigris 11 Hydro-power,irrigation, flood control 1052 750,000
* BCM: Billion Cubic Meters, MW: Megawatt, ha: hectare, L. Zab: Little Zab.
Thus, the negative impact of the completion of all of Turkey’s and Iran’s projects on the Tigris and
Euphrates, including the tributaries of the Tigris, will directly influence the lives of seven million Iraqis
who live on the banks of the rivers, and also 1.9 million hectares of agriculture lands [45]. Despite the
many existing dams, artificial lakes, and regulating connection channels in Iraq, such structures are
not sufficient to manage the surface water requirements. A list of the dams constructed on the Tigris
and Euphrates rivers in all riparian countries with influence on the transboundary water management
is provided in Table 3 and shown in Figure 2.
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4.1.1. Historical Agreements on Transboundary River Basins
The historical conflict regarding the regional water basin—namely, the Tigris-Euphrates
basin—dates back to the early 1920s. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, Turkey,
Syria, and Iraq became independent countries sharing the Euphrates and Tigris waters. The tension
among these riparian countries increased after Turkey started its long-term strategic water manage ent
planning. This change forced both Syria and Iraq together to proceed against Turkey’s water policy
concerning the incoming water through the Tigris and Euphrates rivers [6,42].
Accordingly, numerous agreements and protocols have been signed among or between the
transboundary countries, but unfortunately none of them have gone into force, on account of the
powerful positions of both Turkey and Iran compared to Iraq and Syria. Turkey dominates the Tigris
and Euphrates against Iraq and Syria, while Iran has control of most of the tributaries of the Tigris [5].
4.1.2. Iraqi–Turkish Agreements
In 1923, Iraq signed its first treaty with Turkey called the Lausanne agreement (24/7/1923). Its
Article 109 indicates that both countries must preserve their rights when a water management system
(canal opening, flood dams, irrigation, drainage system, etc.) is built in the territory of another state or
when water is used in the territory of one of the countries [36,49]. The first tension started in 1926 after
the co la se of the Ottoman Empire, when Turkey wanted to change the amounts of disch rged waters
f dow stream countries despite the claims submitted by Syria and Iraq. Tu key did not pay attention
to heir claims, under the pretext that the agreement was irrelevant due to the xisting Turkish political
and conomic situation. In March 1946, a treaty of friendship and good neighbourly relatio s w s
signed between I aq and T rkey in Ankara. Protocol 1 of this treaty focus d on reg lating the wa ers
of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, while Protocol 3, Article 3 focused on economic and technical
cooperation between Iraq and Turkey.
By the early 1960s, the population of the downstream countries had doubled; thus, the demand on
water resources increased dramatically. The downstream countries started to request larger amounts
of water, while Turkey did not pay attention under the pretext of non-rationalizing the consumption of
water [6]. The validity of the 1946 treaty lasted until 1964, when Turkey started to build the Keban
Dam and an electricity power plant on the Euphrates. Despite this step, Turkey promised Syria and
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Iraq (through negotiation with their technical expert teams) to pass 350 m3/s in the Euphrates river.
According to experts from the downstream countries, this amount of water was not sufficient even
for agriculture. In Baghdad in 1965, extensive negotiations took place about the Tigris-Euphrates
basin. Syria opposed Turkey’s proposal, which considered the Tigris-Euphrates as one basin—i.e., in
case the Euphrates could not satisfy the needs of the territory at that time, the Tigris could solve the
problem [42].
In the beginning of the 1970s, Turkey initiated plans for the construction of dams on the shared
rivers. Though Iraq was aware of the need for action, nothing happened until 1975, when Turkey
started the biggest water project in the region, namely the GAP project. At this time, Syria also
started construction of the Tabqa Dam, which angered Iraq further. At the same time, the Turkish
government continued its negotiations with the World Bank to obtain funding for the construction of
the Karakaya Dam on the Euphrates. The World Bank experts laid conditions for Turkish officials to
let 500 m3/s of water pass downstream, while the negotiations continued between Turkey and the
World Bank to inform the downstream countries about the conducted agreement. Both Syria and Iraq
raised claims, which led the World Bank to stop providing funding. This forced Turkey to finance the
project in conjunction with the Ataturk Dam project from its own budget [42]. The Iraqi-Turkish Joint
Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation was established, and in a meeting, held in Ankara
on 5/12/1980 (Article 5), the following points were approved:
1. The two sides agreed to cooperate in the field of pollution control of the shared water in the region;
2. The two sides agreed to form a joint technical committee within two months to study regional
water issues (particularly around the Tigris and Euphrates rivers) and submit their report to the
governments of the three countries (Turkey, Syria, and Iraq) within a period of two years.
In 1987, Turkey and Syria issued the Protocol of Joint Economic Cooperation Committee regarding
the sharing of 500 m3/s of water resources without Iraq, under the pretext that Turkey supported their
Kurdish Revolution in Iraq. For this reason, Iraq did not join the meeting. In 1989, Iraq and Syria
organized their bilateral meetings to sign the agreement on 17 March 1989, and it came into force on 16
April 1990. The two countries agreed that Iraq´s share would be 58% of the Euphrates waters running
out from the Turkish-Syrian border until a tripartite agreement was reached.
The topic of “transboundary rivers” was placed on the table for discussion during a technical
tripartite joint meeting in Ankara in April 1990, as well as during the 16th tripartite meeting in
Damascus in September 1992 [36].
In 1992, Iraq and Turkey initiated negotiations concerning the conflict over the Euphrates shared
waters. When the Ataturk Dam was completed, Turkey cut off the Euphrates waters to fill the dam,
not considering that Iraq had asked for the share of 700 m3/s. The former Prime Minister Suleyman
Demirel announced that “we do not say we share their oil resources. They cannot say they share our
water resources. This is a right of sovereignty. We have the right to do anything we like” [6,50].
At the same time, Turkey received diplomatic notes from Iraq and Syria regarding the negative
impacts of the dam. When the dam temporarily started to cut off 75% of the Euphrates waters, Iraq
declared its preparedness to use force to stop the action, and Turkey mobilized its military for an
emergency and declared that it was ready to cut off the river completely [6].
In 1996, Iraq and Syria sent their protests to Turkey about the construction of the Birecik Dam, as
the Euphrates water level dropped, and the river water was polluted. In 2009, Iraq sent two protest
memoranda to UNESCO and the League of Arab States about the negative impact of the GAP project
on the environmental state of the Shatt Al-Arab River. Iraq indicated the increasing rate of river water
salinization in connection with the decreasing water discharge and lowering river water stages of the
Tigris and Euphrates in response to the ongoing GAP project.
In 2012, Iraq faced the problem of the desertification of marshlands in the southern part of the
country. This forced the government to protest about the risk of the low production of domestic crops.
The Ilisu Dam was finalized in 2015, which worsened the situation by cutting the rate of incoming
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water in the Tigris River to Iraq by half. At the end of 2017, the GAP project came close to its final stages.
It is expected that the outflow of Euphrates water passing the Turkish-Syrian border will be reduced
by 70–80%. This could be a real disaster, so downstream countries are turning to the international
community to address the issue [6].
4.1.3. Iraqi-Syrian Protocols
The first meeting, organized in 1962, emphasized the requirement that both sides shall exchange
information on Euphrates waters and recognize the rights of existing water projects in both countries.
The formation of a permanent body coordinating water management projects on the Euphrates River
was agreed upon [49]. However, later political events prevented the body from being convened. It
should be noted that the functions of this permanent body, which was to be formed in 1962, were the
same as those of the Joint Technical Committee, which the Syrian and Iraqi sides agreed to sign in 1980,
18 years after the first proposal. Both countries overcame their political differences, while they did not
harm their supreme national rights. The Turkish side joined the agreement later, in 1984, and dared to
impose a fait accompli on the sharing of the Euphrates watershed.
The second meeting between the two parties was held in late 1965 in Baghdad (the meeting was
attended by a delegate from the Turkish side). The sharing of the Euphrates River and the preparation
of a timetable for filling the water reservoirs in the basin countries were discussed. The parties did not
reach any concrete results, and considered the meeting to be without positive outcomes because of
the endeavour of each party to give priority to its own interests over the interests of the other basin
states. Syria suggested that Euphrates water was not enough to meet the needs of irrigation for the
three riparian countries. For this reason, Syria proposed to convert some of the Tigris waters to the
Euphrates; Iraq stood against the proposal and kept discussing only the Euphrates [42].
The third meeting was organized in April 1990. In this meeting, Iraq agreed to share the Euphrates
water discharges with Syria, at 42% for Syria and 58% for Iraq.
4.1.4. Iraqi-Iran Protocols
The first important agreement was signed in Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1913, and was
called the Istana Protocol. In line with this agreement, the demarcation of the river border in the
Shatt al-Arab area was carried out in 1914 by a special boundary commission. The boundary was
demarcated at the low water level line on the eastern side of the Shatt al-Arab, except for the area
opposite to Abadan city, where the 7 km-long border line, the Thalowge line, was the deep course of
the line. The agreement allowed Iranian merchant ships to move freely in front of the port city [5]. The
protocol of 1937 claimed that the two countries affirmed the recognition of the water border as laid out
in the “1914 water demarcation protocol” without changes [51]. “Protocol Algiers 1975” was signed
in Algiers on 6 March 1975, when the President of Iraq Saddam Hussein gave up Iraq’s sovereignty
over the other half of the Shatt al-Arab to Iran under the condition that Iran would stop supporting the
Kurdish Revolution in Northern Iraq (recently named the Kurdistan region). The signed agreement
confirmed the new international border line of the Shatt al-Arab as the deep course of the river line.
Despite all mentioned agreements and protocols signed among Iraq and its neighbours concerning
the sharing of transboundary water bodies, unfortunately, none are any longer in force due to political
conflicts. After the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in 2003, the Iraqi institutions totally fell apart, and
Iranian interference and dominance over political decisions in later stages of the conflict consequently
kept Iraq from securing its water rights.
4.2. Water Balance
Sustainable water management requires reaching a long-term equilibrium of surface and
groundwater resources (inflows, precipitation) with sinks (evapotranspiration, runoff from watershed)
and water exploitation. Despite the poor policies of the Kurdistan Region and the negative impacts
of drought and climate change, the current status of the water bodies of the Kurdistan Region is
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still preserved. According to Reference [44], Iraq annually receives 70.92 billion m3 of water and
consumes 60.43 billion m3. The annual decreases in the Tigris and Euphrates waters are 0.1335 and
0.245 billion m3, respectively. Accordingly, the average annual demand on incoming water through the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers in 2020 is predicted to increase to 42.884 billion m3 and 29.225 billion m3,
respectively, representing a total of 72.069 billion m3; this indicates that the shortage amount will be
approximately 8.609 billion m3. Furthermore, groundwater is also affected in the Tigris and Euphrates
basin; studies have indicated that the overall loss of groundwater in the basin was nearly 144 billion
m3 from 2003–2009 [52].
Based on the water management report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources
(MAWR), the average annual inflow of surface water from the upstream neighbouring countries,
Turkey and Iran, amounts to approximately 11.3 billion m3. This is equivalent to a discharge of
537 m3/s as a mean annual inflow of surface water into the Kurdistan Region through the Tigris River
tributaries of Khabour, Greater Zab, Little Zab, and Sirwan [43].
The mean annual flow of the surface water from the Kurdistan Region into Iraqi territories is
estimated at 22.4 billion m3, which is equivalent to 1064 m3/s. From the difference between the inflow
and outflow measurements, it could be concluded that the Kurdistan Region feeds Iraq with surface
water through the rivers mentioned above with approximately 50% of the total amount of surface
water inflow into Kurdistan [48].
The groundwater conditions are also affected by the same factors mentioned in the previous
paragraphs. Research carried out in Duhok governorate emphasized that the drawdown of static
groundwater levels in Duhok city was approximately 3.79 m in confined aquifers and 7.09 m in
unconfined aquifers in 2010 [53], while the same deterioration could be found in the Aqra-Bardarash
basin (the wealthiest basin in Iraq), where the decline of groundwater table is approximately 4.78 m
in the eastern part and 4.13 m in the western part of the Khazir River [54]. Moreover, Qurtas [55]
indicated that the groundwater level in the Erbil plain had decreased by approximately 30 m in
some areas. Meanwhile, the reports of the MAWR indicate a decrease of groundwater levels in some
regions in Suleiymaniya governorate of up to 50 m. Unfortunately, officials in the Kurdistan Region
failed to carry out comprehensive annual surveys concerning the water balance for both surface and
groundwater resources.
Springs are the traditional source of water supply for both domestic use and irrigation in most of
the mountainous regions of Kurdistan. The current records of the Ministry of Irrigation and Water
Resources indicate the number of registered springs in Duhok governorate to be approximately 2860,
while the total number in the Kurdistan Region is estimated at 10,000. From 2008–2016, many springs
dried up due to the low rate of precipitation, especially in distant mountainous areas, because the
saturated thickness did not meet the current yearly recharge according to the General Directorate of
Meteorology and Seismology [56].
Water resources are mainly used in Kurdistan in two sectors: for domestic use as drinking water
sources and for agricultural irrigation purposes. Potable water requirements cover about one third
of total water demands. The MAWR adopted a master plan to decrease the current two thirds of
consumption for agriculture by 15% (see Table 4). Additionally, the Ministry of Municipality, as a
relevant institution for water supply, planned to separate the domestic water resources from the
agricultural resources.
Water 2018, 10, 1651 13 of 19
Table 4. Water demand—potable water vs. water for agriculture, data source [43].
Domestic Water Supply Mio. m3/year
(ADD) Irrigation Mio. m
3/year
2010 2030 Current After Implementation ofthe Strategic Plan
Erbil 178 328 439 2.199
Duhok 129 240 186 999
Erbil + Duhok 307 568 625 3.198
% of total demand 33 15 67 85
% of today’s demand 100 187 100 511
ADD: Average Daily Demand.
The over-exploitation of water resources is considered to be one of the great challenges in Iraq.
To overcome this problem, officials must dispute this strategy on the local level to motivate the
involvement of NGOs in public policy debates and to establish a program to set up a specific database
regarding the qualitative and quantitative status of water bodies (according to EU WFD), particularly
for groundwater resources [53,57]. Accordingly, the Kurdistan Regional Government issued some laws,
legislative documents, and regulations related to the protection of groundwater bodies. According to
the authority given by the MAWR, Act No. 6 (2015), Item No. 5, Clause No. 3, specifies the following
rules and measures focused on the improvement of the quantitative status of groundwater bodies [58].
Item 1: Identification of the related institutions that have the right of supervision of these
regulations;
Item 2: The distance between drilled wells specified in different geographical regions as follows:
In mountainous areas, not less than 250 m, while in plains, from 400–500 m as specified for each
governorate;
Item 3: The distance of a well site from springs and seepage sites should be at least 500 m;
Item 4: The licensing of drilled wells for irrigation should require the confirmation of related
institutions;
Item 5: Instructions for the drilling of drinking water wells for public use should pass through
some specific steps in coordination with the related officials (desk and field actions needed);
Item 6: Instructions for the drilling of wells for the private sector. The owner must apply for
a license according to the conditions issued for this purpose by related institutions (desk and field
actions needed).
Iraqi officials represented by the Ministry of Water Resources (Iraqi central government) seek to
achieve the following objectives based on Act No. 50 [59]:
• Organize water distribution, reduce the risk of flooding, control surface runoff, and conserve a
good state of river basins;
• Carry out in-depth studies and research related to irrigation, reclamation, dams, and groundwater,
and establish designs and related documents through institutions and other associated authorities;
• Management, operation, and maintenance of dam projects, reclamation, irrigation, drainage,
and groundwater;
• Coordinate actions with international, regional, and Arabic organizations and NGOs specialized
in water resources and environmental issues;
• Negotiate plans of the MAWR with planning authorities, water consumption sectors, and other
relevant sectors in accordance with sustainable development in Iraq;
• Develop modern techniques and a geographic information system (GIS) to improve working
methods in the MAWR. Technical staff should be trained to utilize advanced scientific procedures
in water management;
• Adopt the principle of awareness to conserve water wealth and protect water from pollution.
Officials should request help from NGOs to achieve the objectives.
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In spite of the existing simple procedures such as groundwater level monitoring, there are no
active strategies to fill the gap that has existed in the deterioration of groundwater levels since the
drought periods 1999–2001 and 2007–2009 [53,57].
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
Based on an overview of the water management issues in Iraq (with special attention to the
Kurdistan Region) and the legislative framework in force, it can be concluded that environmental
objectives in the sustainable water system protection that would ensure a good state of water bodies
will not be easy to achieve. The implementation of principles of the EU WFD in Iraq faces not only
technical challenges; the region has long been economically and politically unstable, with current
waves of immigration from neighbouring regions suffering from war conflicts (e.g., Syria).
Iraq, being a downstream country whose watercourses (the Euphrates, the Tigris, and their
tributaries) have their headwaters in Turkey and Iran, still does not have effective agreements relating
to the quantity and quality issues of the shared water. This situation coincides with high population
growth in all the water-sharing countries, and possible conflict is a critical issue. Politically, Iraq
and Syria lack a strong influential position for enforcing their water demands, while they have no
long-term strategies related to water resource harvesting through the application of rational techniques
on water utilization in different sectors, unlike Turkey and Iran. It is apparent that the conflict issues
among the riparian countries will have to be resolved in negotiations mediated by a third party.
According to Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, the UN or its agencies provide
investigation, mediation, arbitration, and the judiciary to aid committed countries in the resolution
of disputes and to reach a peaceful solution to conflicts that might threaten peace and result in
water conflicts.
Many disputes have been resolved through the mediation of the UN and its agencies, for example,
the disputes over the Al-Sindh waters (India and Pakistan) and the waters of the Kang (India and
Bangladesh); through arbitration, such as the dispute concerning the Malando River (Afghanistan
and Iran); or through the judiciary, such as the disputes concerning the Banana River (Belgium and
the Netherlands) and the Oder River (Poland and the Czech Republic), etc. On the other hand, the
whole region is influenced by water resource shortage due to water mismanagement and also climate
change. The Kurdistan Regional Government should pay attention to problems related to water
pollution as a main hazardous risk in the region. These problems must be addressed as soon as
possible through the implementation of water management strategies, inspired, for example, by the
EU Water Framework Directive.
The Iraqi water authorities have dedicated a large budget to water supply, while data indicate that
the recovery costs did not fill the shortage gap. This indicates that the government should re-evaluate
its policies regarding consumption fees to meet the recovery costs. In spite of the existing regulations,
excessive pumping with a huge drop in water levels still represents one of the highlighted points that
threaten the groundwater situation, coinciding with the effect of climate change as the most influential
factor since the drought period of 1999–2009. The water management practices concerning the reuse of
wastewater after treatment for irrigation and industrial uses, the decrease of water lost in the drinking
water supply systems, artificial recharge, etc., need to be re-assessed.
The analyses of data collected by Iraqi governmental institutions such as the Directorate of
Groundwater, Directorate of Water Distribution, and Directorate of Statistics and Hydrometeorological
Institute have been performed with a focus on water quantity together with field reconnaissance. Based
on the analysis, the first practical steps in water management practices in Kurdistan (Iraq) aiming at
improving the ecological status of surface water and quantitative status of groundwater (EU WFD)
could be implemented as follows:
• Re-registration of the wells that have been illegally drilled to control the quality and quantity of
water resources, and adopting strict authorization conditions for deep wells drilling;
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• Installation of measuring gauges on drinking water networks to control the water consumption
fees regarding the recovery cost policy;
• Government encouragement of its institutions to decrease the use of groundwater and replace it
with the use of surface water as an alternative;
• Support the establishment of surface water projects to construct dams (e.g., completing Bekhma
Dam on Greater Zab river, Bakurman Dam on Khazir river, and Barhol Dam on Khabour river);
• Supporting measures aimed at increasing a retention of water in a landscape and preventing fast
overland outflow from the river basin during flood events and during wet seasons. We propose
establishment of ponds on the seasonal streams (with the capacity of 0.5 to 5 million m3) to be
used for the multisectoral purposes: irrigation, fishery, tourism, environment conservation, etc.;
• Decreasing a full dependence of rural areas on groundwater use by the construction of
infrastructure transferring river water to distant areas;
• Intensification of modern irrigation techniques (drop water) to decrease the evaporation lost and
water consumption for irrigation purposes;
• Re-use of the discharged wastewater to make up for the gap and relieve the stress on water
supply projects;
• Application of artificial recharge as a modern technique to recover the negative impact on
groundwater status;
• Construction of treatment stations in transition streams under the monitoring control of
environmental experts aimed at the re-use of drainage and wastewater for irrigation, washing,
and other daily industrial and domestic uses except drinking;
• Collection of rainwater for, e.g., re-use for irrigation and washing. This measure should be
mandatory for newly constructed buildings and building structures (car parking) funded by both
the state and the private sector;
• Imposition of taxes on private wells or, rather, installation of measuring gauges;
• Introducing water management planning in a river basin scale with updating in 5 years’ planning
cycles; improve predictions on water demands in various sectors;
• Preventing overexploitation of aquifers through excessive pumping; perform study on calculation
of exploitable groundwater reserves under climate change (hydrogeological survey, rainfall-runoff,
and hydrogeological modelling);
• Establishment of a new water directive framework for the Kurdistan Region through effective
coordination among the related ministries, including all necessary legislations concerning both
surface water and groundwater status;
• Re-activation of related committees in the Kurdistan Parliament to play their effective roles in the
monitoring and implementation of water directive legislations.
Proper water management could significantly influence the water consumption (water
management practices, setting of the right prices—EU WFD) and loss of water (maintenance of
infrastructure). The authorities can promote practices of water re-use, encourage inhabitants, industry,
and agriculture to save water and to implement up-to-date water management practices (irrigation),
etc. The encouragement of closer citizen involvement (EU WFD objective) is ongoing. However, the
majority of these measures are dependent on financial resources which are not currently available
from either the state (Iraqi Government), the Kurdistan regional government, and local authorities or
private budgets. This is the primary obstacle to the implementation of the proposed measures.
It is essential to clearly define the responsibilities of water authorities at all levels, from the
municipal level, to the regional Kurdistan Government, up to the central Iraqi Government. However,
in reality the improvements will take decades. The central Iraqi Government is struggling to develop
its institutions and implement any water framework directive, including negotiations with upstream
countries about the utilization of strategic water facilities (dams). The Kurdistan Region cannot find a
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solution to water shortage by the construction new dams, since such projects are under the jurisdiction
and responsibility of the federal government in Baghdad.
The local authorities are not able to stop trading on water resources (illegal connections to water
networks) and reduce illegal drilling of wells. Based on the information from the MAWR General
Directorate of Water Resources, the illegal drilled wells number 11,000 out of the 25,000 in the whole of
Kurdistan. A missing legal framework and the absence of effective penalties (enforceability of law) are
obstacles to the solution. The streamlining of legislation (EU WFD objective) is a challenge both for
regional and central government.
• Actions are urgently needed due to the arrival of nearly two million IDPs and Syrian refugees to
the region during 2004–2014. Global warming will probably result in repeated periods of drought,
and thus further deteriorate the water balance situation.
• The academic and research institutions in Kurdistan are aware of the necessity for deeper scientific
studies regarding water balance. Such studies are ongoing in the phase of collecting data
and constructing numerical models of groundwater flow and rainfall runoff models at a river
basin scale (EU WFD approach). The conclusions of the studies will contribute to the proposal
of monitoring network (data gaps) and the description of the present status of surface and
groundwater bodies.
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